New Red and Orange Line Cars

Definitely accurate that not all of this is within CRRC's control.

However, I still think we are being too soft on them with regard to some of the other problems that have gone on specifically as it relates to the Springfield factory and delays that have happened over there. Just my opinion.
At least according to what I've heard from Eng in interviews, the MBTA is being tougher on them in other ways. MBTA has used some authority to have tougher oversight over the factory. They've fixed some QC protocols. Stuff like that. Being tougher in those ways hopefully gets us the new trains as soon as possible.

As for paying CRCC another $150M, yeah, not great. It would be really bad if CRCC was still just flailing and we throw more money at the problem. It's not as bad if MBTA is confident that problems at the factory are getting sorted, and that money is a reasonable estimate for what it'll actually take to deliver the trains. If the MBTA is convinced that money is actually needed to finish the trains, then withholding is a bad way to be tough. They'll risk not getting the trains, or just getting junk.

In any case, the MBTA is picking between only bad options. As long as they've stepped up their oversight, then this doesn't seem like the worst.
 
This is due to the derailment pair. Because of the derailment pair, 122 delivered Orange Line cars is the total to offset the out of service derailment pair. This way, 120 new Orange Line cars would be available in service to match the pre-COVID fleet.

I also have an identical copy of the trains in service to headways chart, under pre-slow zone schedules.
View attachment 49073

Thanks! It appears your table assumes about a 10-15 minute more efficient base-line round trip than mine does. Easily explainable with the current slow zones.
 
Thanks! It appears your table assumes about a 10-15 minute more efficient base-line round trip than mine does. Easily explainable with the current slow zones.
It's intentional, since the Orange Line slow zones are expected to be fully addressed by January 1st, 2025 in the track improvement restoration program, so it's unneccessary to extrapolate to 20 Orange Line trainsets using 15 minutes of slow zone delay.
 
It's intentional, since the Orange Line slow zones are expected to be fully addressed by January 1st, 2025 in the track improvement restoration program, so it's unneccessary to extrapolate to 20 Orange Line trainsets using 15 minutes of slow zone delay.
Yep! I totally agree. I was looking for somebody with a more buttoned-up calculation and you provided it. I appreciate it. Thanks.
 
Well said. It's easy fodder for the media: "The MBTA is throwing another $150 Million at a CHINESE company to complete an already delayed existing contract!" And the media would be right. But the reality is that we badly need these cars, a lot has change since the initial contract was signed, and there probably isn't another way to obtain those cars without spending more and/or waiting much longer. I actually appreciate that the MBTA chose to face the reality head on rather than allow CRCC to fail or put the remainder of the order out to bid again. From a strictly political standpoint, it would have been easier to do take the latter approach and publicly drag CRCC through the mud for "failing to deliver."
That, and even with this additional funding, it's costing less than any of the other bidders would have...
 

For those who can't read it from the Boston Globe posting, which I can't. :mad:
 
Orange isn't going to 3-min. frequency; that's Red-only. 4.5 mins. is Orange Transformation's top target. That requires the full 152-car order to be fulfilled, and for the planned ATO signal optimizations to be implemented.
Orange isn't going to 3-min. frequency; that's Red-only. 4.5 mins. is Orange Transformation's top target. That requires the full 152-car order to be fulfilled, and for the planned ATO signal optimizations to be implemented.
Indulge me please
 
Indulge me please
They'll use 21-22 peak trainsets to meet the headway target, plus 3-4 spare sets (same as previously for the old fleet) for maintenance rotations and run-as-directed holds. The signal mods re-tailor the block layout for the CRRC cars' much faster takeoff acceleration and braking. That way trains stopped at a station block don't induce as many braking maneuvers on trains on the adjacent blocks because the station blocks are getting cleared faster and can be shrunk a bit in size. A Red Line example for how that would help is the current situation where Park St. occupancy (and dwell problems in clearing the station at rush) habitually causes inbound after inbound to crawl painfully slow over the Longfellow and in/out of Charles MGH because of adjacent-block occupancy constantly inducing a tight speed restriction. The signal mods would largely lick that problem and its associated bunching issues by shortening the blocks and loosening the speed penalties on adjacent blocks to be less brute-force while still keeping stop/speed enforcement completely fail-safe. On Orange it would treat any similar such congestion-induced slow zones to make the rush hour hold more faithfully to the headway target instead of constantly decaying under peak loading.

I don't know why they picked 4.5 mins. instead of 3 when Orange has no Harvard Curve -like absolute headway limiters. Something in their traffic modeling said that was the sweet spot for the line's loading.
 
From today's Globe: Can the T Avoid Another Debacle on the Next Big Train Order?

MBTA general manager Phil Eng has a lot riding on his decision to give CRRC until 2027 to deliver several hundred long-overdue Orange and Red Line cars — and to pay the Chinese state-owned company an additional $148 million to finally follow through on its promises. The T is also forgiving $90 million in penalties for delays and deficiencies and could end up forgiving another $37 million in accrued penalties.

Why? According to Eng, the alternative — hiring another company to finish building the trains — would cost more and take more time. Given that, he’s trying to make the best out of a bad situation. Getting those desperately needed new rail cars as soon as possible is the T’s priority. But for those T riders who are still stuck riding old cars — and for anyone else who cares about how taxpayer money is spent in Massachusetts — it sure looks like CRRC is being rewarded for poor performance.
The only way this saga can have a silver lining is if it leads to a change in the way the T handles large procurements in the future.

To recap an old, sad story: In 2014, CRRC won a $566 million contract to supply the MBTA with 284 new Orange and Red Line cars. It was the low bidder at the time. The contract was increased twice (in 2017 and 2020) to a total value of about $870 million when additional cars were ordered. The cars are being assembled at a Springfield factory that CRRC built at a cost to the company of $95 million. The state took no federal money, so it could require CRRC to build its manufacturing facility in Massachusetts. The T was supposed to have a total of 404 new cars by last September. To date, it has 114 of 152 new Orange Line cars and 18 of 252 Red Line cars. Not all of the delivered cars are in operation; some are still in their pre-service testing/inspection phase, according to a T spokesperson.

To be clear, Eng inherited the CRRC mess when he took over the GM’s job a year ago. At that point, however, it became his to solve, and now he owns it. Given CRRC’s track record, why is Eng confident the company can deliver what it failed to deliver in the past? “We have brought a higher level of attention to the interactions (with CRRC), to decision making and to be able to give direction where needed,” he told the editorial board. CRRC also brought on “more senior people”, he said, and “we took a really deep dive” into production line problems. The production line issue, he said, “is something that I wish they had taken care of before, because we could have straightened this out much sooner. And we would probably be further ahead. But it wasn’t.”

Eng is sympathetic to some challenges faced by CRRC. For example, tariffs imposed by the Trump administration on rail equipment imported from China added to the company’s costs and the pandemic brought unexpected supply chain issues and related workplace issues. But as The Globe has reported, the Springfield factory where the cars are assembled was also beset by “chronic quality issues” outlined in a letter sent to the company in 2022 by Mark DeVitto, the T’s deputy director of vehicle engineering. Several former workers also told the Globe about a disorganized and toxic workplace environment, which led to mistakes and delays long before the pandemic began.

Now, going forward, what lessons should be learned from the CRRC debacle?

Choosing the low bidder fit CRRC’s business strategy, at least at the outset, which was to demonstrate its capabilities with the hope of growing its business in the United States. So the company undoubtedly underbid, figuring it would make up for any losses with additional business. It did win other contracts, but then tariffs and other government-imposed restrictions undercut its business model. The company faced price escalations, as did its subcontractors. Whether choosing the low bidder worked to the state’s benefit is an open question, given the extra price it’s now paying, while still awaiting delivery of much of what it ordered. Eng insists the price per car, which will “only be paid as we get delivery, is still a very good price.”

To protect itself, Eng said that one thing the state should do is build price adjustments into future procurement contracts. Keeping up on car maintenance is also important, he said, to keep T equipment in the best possible state of repair. It’s also important to think about replacing cars long before what is called “the useful end of life” — which is about 30 years for a rail car, he said. “What I’d like to do is find a way to not only commit to a car procurement contract earlier, but have a longer-term relationship with a vendor, whereby the non-recurring costs such as the initial design can be utilized over a longer period of time.” For example, Blue Line cars are about 18 years old and Eng said he is already thinking about a replacement plan.

A major goal of the CRRC contract was to provide jobs for Massachusetts workers, and from the T’s perspective, that remains a key benefit. “We want that plant in Springfield, we want those jobs,” said Eng. Indeed, US Rep. Richard Neal, a big cheerleader for the plant which is located in his district, put out a press release lauding Eng for “putting forth a plan that will deliver on all fronts for all of Massachusetts: completing manufacturing of the remaining Red and Orange Line cars, while protecting the 400 union jobs at CRRC’s manufacturing plant in Springfield.” Protecting union jobs is fine, if those union workers are producing quality work, on deadline. As CRRC’s production history shows, that wasn’t always the case. But Eng is sympathetic to that, too, saying, “These are high-pressure jobs... How do we put them (workers) in a position where they understand that their work is important and that we appreciate the work they are doing?

That, too, is now on Eng — along with the commitment to deliver, once and for all, what CRRC is being paid by the taxpayers of Massachusetts to deliver.
 
Personal opinion: Any media coverage complaining about the CRRC delivery, without sheding light on the internal politics that resulted in CRRC being handed the bid in the first place, is insufficient. That's also a problem that Eng himself or even the MBTA as a whole can't solve.
 
Jeezus, Globe proofreaders...

CRRC didn't win the bid in 2014. Their predecessor company, CSR, lost the bid to CNR on concerns they couldn't meet the technical requirements. Then CSR bought out winner CNR to form CRRC several months later. The bid process wasn't flawed. The unqualified bidders lost. What nobody could anticipate at the time was that a spurned unqualified bidder would just up and buy the winning qualified bidder, then screw up the whole process by applying their own shoddy management over the qualified bidder.
 
Jeezus, Globe proofreaders...

CRRC didn't win the bid in 2014. Their predecessor company, CSR, lost the bid to CNR on concerns they couldn't meet the technical requirements. Then CSR bought out winner CNR to form CRRC several months later. The bid process wasn't flawed. The unqualified bidders lost. What nobody could anticipate at the time was that a spurned unqualified bidder would just up and buy the winning qualified bidder, then screw up the whole process by applying their own shoddy management over the qualified bidder.
I'd make a bit of a caveat here: CSR didn't even lose, they were straight up disqualified by the MBTA from even participating in the bid after the initial RFP.

I think also any article on this needs to call out in the first paragraph the decision to require a new plant in Springfield, and it's effect on forfeiting matching federal funding for Buy America, and, it's limiting of qualified bidders in the first place who already had US plants.
 
Update shows 112 Orange Line cars and 18 Red Line cars delivered.

The delivered Orange Line fleet is now down to only a 10 car shortage below the pre-COVID fleet (again, +2 for derailment pair).
I dont get why the headways are still so bad for OL? This doesnt seem like a huge deficit at this point.
 
I dont get why the headways are still so bad for OL? This doesnt seem like a huge deficit at this point.
Operationally, you are going to have likely 20% of the available fleet sidelined for routine maintenance and inspection, perhaps more as you are still carefully qualifying the new cars.
 
  • Like
Reactions: FK4
Operationally, you are going to have likely 20% of the available fleet sidelined for routine maintenance and inspection, perhaps more as you are still carefully qualifying the new cars.
I suspect the neverending warranty mods are sidelining an even larger percentage of the active fleet at any given moment. Those wouldn't be reflected in the 'official' roster listings at all, but day-to-day fleet availability is probably pretty poor given the punchlists of things (like computer firmware) that need to be constantly updated in the already-delivered cars as they stamp out issues on the fresh deliveries.
 

SEPTA pulls the nuclear option on CRRC, outright cancels its order for 45 bi-level commuter rail coaches after the pilot units assembled at Springfield were plagued with so many problems that no deliveries actually took place. Procurement was running 4 years behind schedule.
 
Last edited:
Orange Line up to 15 trains running peak service
IMG_5146.jpeg
 

SEPTA pulls the nuclear option on CRRC, outright cancels its order for 45 bi-level commuter rail coaches after the pilot units assembled at Springfield were plagued with so many problems that no deliveries actually took place. Procurement was running 4 years behind schedule.
Only 4 years behind schedule? A dream.
 

Back
Top