Funding Source and Work Plan for Transit Expansion

I think you may be underestimating the ripple effect of the T on our transportation system. People who commute from Springfield to Worcester would see an impact in their commute, let alone someone traveling to the edge of the city. And all those 'free' spots? You are suddenly competing with thousands on new drivers for them. I doubt there are that many.

There is also a huge economic ripple effect from a well-funded T. Ease of commute is a big reason talented workers stay in city/state and that talent pool attracts more companies which starts a virtuous spiral that effects you whether you can see it or not.

Look, if you want to fund the T correctly, then somebody is going to have to take their portion of the Big Dig debt off their hands. Just the interest payments alone absolutely crush their bottom line. Until this burden is lifted, every other proposal is like putting a Band-Aid over a gunshot wound.

Why is it always the working class who has to foot the bill for government excess and inefficiency?
 
So, in short, your true stance is not against a tax for funding a badly managed MBTA, nor against taxes because you want the benefit to be direct as possible to the user, you are just anti-tax.


Your argument signals there no place for any justification. No matter how directly beneficial or not. It doesn't matter if the MBTA fix its act up before it asks for money. Nor how much low the gas tax get chipped down by inflation and thus genuinely needs a raise to continue cover basic maintenance. Nor a tax to pay directly for some kind of infrastructure - even for a road project apparently. Regardless of one can show something like this "this somethings-something has reach this much to fix something and genuinely just need this to find a way to cover it." You're against it.


Thus, you'll always be the guy in the room screaming the the meeting of you're against it. I'm not rich myself either. I am just a middle class guy like you. It's not fun to see how much your paycheck get lobbed off (and literally just got handed my first live paycheck for my new position and get to see how much it got lobbed off).

But I care about the justification. If there's a real need for something that shown to be in good form (thus an MBTA that fixes the $1BN overrun and continue to kill off its insane overtime and etc), then my ears are open. Especially, I'm rational enough to see a gas tax hike would change my gas from $1.75 to $1.85 (or if it goes back to old prices, so $3.50 to $3.60). I'm not so hard-headed to cry that it is unacceptable. I'm willing to on the risk to being a dupe of paying 10 cents more for the chance of seeing better condition roads and transit.
 
Look, if you want to fund the T correctly, then somebody is going to have to take their portion of the Big Dig debt off their hands. Just the interest payments alone absolutely crush their bottom line. Until this burden is lifted, every other proposal is like putting a Band-Aid over a gunshot wound.

Why is it always the working class who has to foot the bill for government excess and inefficiency?

While your previous lines indicates you don't really care and thus these arguments does not hold trust persuasion to your stance. I'll still bite to point out that you made. The Big Dig debt will have to be paid one way or another. If we take it out of the MBTA and into the state books, that may mean diverting funding for something else (which I don't know what to cut in this conversation), or raising revenues - thus a tax. Technically, if the argument is based on paying tax to pay directly for costs on the thing taxed on - then a gas tax to pay for Big Dig debt have an argument.
 
I am not anti-tax. I am anti ADDITIONAL tax, especially on the individual. If you want more money, let's start with the 10's of millions of corporate tax breaks. Or, as an alternative, let's reign in some of the wasteful spending, including with the MBTA. (for instance, paying people to stay home) Let's stop making the first option nickel and diming the middle class who can least afford the extra burden. All of the other costs around here (RENT!) are outpacing inflation too much for the government to keep extending its hand and asking us to pay more.
 
Why is it always the working class who has to foot the bill for government excess and inefficiency?

On this we agree. I also would like to see a much (MUCH) more progressive tax structure.

That said, I don't mind paying my fair share. I see taxes as an investment rather than an expense. Sometimes my money isn't invested exactly how I would like it to be but for the most part I understand I'll see some sort of direct or indirect benefit from my tax dollars.
 
1. Gas price floor (I believe that's the term): gas tax adjusts so that average gas price never goes below a certain amount (let's say $3.) Drivers now have a more predictable expense and when gas prices are low, the state takes in more gas tax revenue for transportation in general. (Could go to road maintenance or transit service.)
2. High-speed variable tolls on major highways. Tolls go up and down throughout the day based on congestion levels. Drivers benefit by never having to deal with massive traffic delays. State takes in more revenue for transportation.
 
Re a bike tax, where it's been done, it costs more to administer than money that it brings in. My car excise tax was $35. What would my bike excise tax be? $1? $5? Hardly worth collecting if you ask me.
 
Variable tolling, like variable meter parking rates, is an excellent tool to both raise revenue and influence behavior.
 
The MBTA needs to fix the current mess and then create an integrated plan for what they want to achieve before they even consider their sources of funding.

Seattle has a ballot question about funding a $20B expansion of their rapid transit, but they have plans for it all how they tie together and benefits.
http://soundtransit3.org/shaping-st3#compare-projects

What does the MBTA have? A bunch of disjointed proposal and current projects that continue to be hit with costs over runs.

First, the MBTA needs to grow capabilities within the org so we don't have $700M estimates for a half mile Red/Blue connector or a $3B GLX expansion that is 10x the costs of other light rail expansions in the country.

Second, they need to create a process to roadmap and manage a portfolio of projects. Look at the individual projects as a portfolio of projects that provide incremental benefits to the ultimate goal. There are many methods of doing this, but one that is gaining traction in other government agencies is creating efficient frontiers of projects. NOAA uses this method with regards to investments in satellites and define it as such.



Examine the costs, risks, and benefits provided for each one and group them accordingly to maximize the ultimate benefit/risk reductions for a given resource funding. At that point, the MBTA/State can start looking at funding.

Thank you for clarifying my intent with this thread. I was trying to ask these questions: what is a portfolio of projects that the T should sell to the public as a 30-year investment plan for SOGR and expansion? What is the most critical portfolio to sustain regional growth and fix key operational issues with the system? And how much can we expect that package to cost? I presented this backwards in my original post, bringing up funding before the portfolio. I should have asked the questions differently.

The only way to get the public to consent to additional funding is to show them how worthwhile the investment will be to them. That's why I've cited Seattle and Los Angeles as great examples. In these regions the public voted for additional funding because it was very clear that what they were funding were coordinated regional investments that vastly enhanced their transit networks. I agree that now the T does a very bad job at thinking this strategically, which frankly is surprising given its size and ridership (but that is is a whole other thread...).
 
I think you may be underestimating the ripple effect of the T on our transportation system. People who commute from Springfield to Worcester would see an impact in their commute, let alone someone traveling to the edge of the city. And all those 'free' spots? You are suddenly competing with thousands on new drivers for them. I doubt there are that many.

There is also a huge economic ripple effect from a well-funded T. Ease of commute is a big reason talented workers stay in city/state and that talent pool attracts more companies which starts a virtuous spiral that effects you whether you can see it or not.


I think these arguments are a bit moot. We already saw what happens when the MBTA trains shut down. The effects on car traffic are not pretty.

That said, the general taxpayers are already providing well over half of the MBTA's budget. Gas tax revenue is also being diverted to the MBTA from road projects. It is something that Western Mass residents resent quite a bit, rightfully so.

If anything there should be less money diverted from the gas tax funds to fund transit. Even from just an MBTA perspective, having roads and bridges maintained for the buses is a critical part of the transportation system and right now the MBTA is getting a free ride on that too. If the system were sustainably in balance, bus fares would be going towards road and bridge maintenance. Bottom line is that operationally, the MBTA is already very well subsidized and needs to focus on operating cost reductions.

I disagree that car transportation is something that should be taxed as a negative as a way to artificially discourage use. Car transportation is necessary, more economical and preferable in many more situations than mass transit is. It is an entirely narrow metro centric view that says everyone should live in apartments and go only wherever the train takes them. Not even the over-idealized European countries live that way. Europe mostly uses cars too.

Making car transportation arbitrarily more expensive is already a drag on the overall economy.

If we are talking about funding transit expansion (or expanding capacity of roads and bridges), then I think we need to be focused on combinations of broad based taxes and local taxes where the benefits are primarily local. While things like gas taxes should be focused exclusively on operations and maintenance of existing road, highway and bridge capacity. Just as transit fares should be focused on operations and maintenance and not system expansion or extraneous things.


Sales tax. Already raised to support transit in 2009. Check. The only reasonable next step that I see is to accelerate increases to the municipal assessments in proportion to their reliance on the MBTA. Or have extra MBTA local assessments go specifically into expansion funds for particular projects. That way Somerville could be paying more to the MBTA and not see it washed and diluted away in a thousand spreadsheets, but rather show up as a line item in a projects spreadsheet. That would really give the local communities a bigger say in their investments in those projects. Otherwise if we are talking about general funds, then I think you have to take a look at where to cut.

And I would take a much harder look at overhauling state government to reduce costs and move more spending over to transportation. There are far too many people at work checking forms, and enforcing redundant and unnecessary regulations when we need more people actually building and maintaining our transportation.
 
This is a great topic, but let's move beyond theory for a moment. Here's what I can offer, I've (for some fucking reason) spent a lot time picking apart the way that transit services are funded in Denmark and metropolitan Copenhagen and how they integrate with the political authorities. I'll give a long(er) write-up tomorrow or Monday that breaks it down and we can compare/contrast the different models that are employed in Boston. which I'll also scope out for the sake of comparison. Hopefully somebody can offer insight into another city in either the US or Europe because funding sources are as diverse as they are important to transit service provision and we can create a little cheat-sheet.

However, I do want to set a basic framework for the MBTA and Boston. First, we need to accept the basic notion that taxes are redistributive. You don't have to like it, but that's reality and if there's anything to be gained from this discussion, we need to deal with the on-the-ground reality. Some roads are self-sufficient. Others are not.

I'll go over this more in depth in the upcoming post(s), but the 18th, 19th, and first-half of the 20th century model of redistribution in Massachusetts erred heavily towards metropolitan Boston subsidizing public works in other regions of the State. The Mass State Highway Commission (the first such State agency in the US) didn't construct any public ways in Boston for decades after it's inception in 1893, focusing entirely on local roads in developing suburbs and rural areas, but with it's capital deriving from State taxes levied primarily within metropolitan Boston. The 1919-successor to the MHC, the Department of Public Works, would eventually assume a larger role in Metropolitan projects, but not in any substantial way until after WWII. For many years at the end of the 19th/start of the 20th century, the budget of the city of Boston was larger than that of the State and most Metropolitan projects were designed and directed by Metropolitan agencies (like the MPC/MDC or Boston Transit Commission) with funds sourced locally from the Metropolitan District. In fact, the history of redistribution away from Boston to less-developed areas stretches back to the late 18th/early 19th century, when the General Court permitted the first major public works projects undertaken in the State - the Turnpikes and Bridges. Most of those projects within then-urbanized areas were undertaken with private capital, the rural routes (particularly in Western Mass, routes that still to this day form to the backbone of local, non-interstate travel) received substantial public help.

However, the opposite is also true. As Boston careened toward mid-century, Detroit-on-the-Atlantic economic collapse, State funds - generated in the Metropolitan areas and farther and farther-flung commuter suburbs did prop up the city through the lean years. So let's do away with the "I pay for your shit" argument for the time being, all it does is to retard a conversation that's actually worth having and it's almost never true.

So, let's make sure we're on the same page. The FY2016 MBTA generated about $1.9 billion in revenue - up from $1 billion in FY2001. A hair under $1 billion of the FY2016 derives from sales taxes (a little over 50%). Sales taxes are also the source fund for State Aid, which is administered by the State to municipalities (both rich and poor) for various reasons, but primarily for educational support. Boston generates more sales tax revenue than any other political entity in Mass by an order of magnitude - in the early aughts it received more proportionally funds from State Aid than it contributed to the pot, but that has not been the case for the last decade when Boston generates more than it receives (this is excluding the sales taxes administered to the MBTA). Fares account for over $600 mil, close to 30% of MBTA ops budget, and vary wildly by mode - I'll break the modal splits down later, because it's a) important and b) shows that rapid transit portions of the system are generally cost-effective from both operating and capital budgeting perspectives and essentially subsidize higher net-cost services like the CR and bus network. Community assessments account for $160+ million, a little under 10% of revenues.

This part is for you Tangent: community assessments are determined through a complex formula that weights the proportional population of a town within the MBTA Service District, the town's location within three distinct "belts" ("inner"=rapid transit, MTA's former service district, "middle", and "outer"), and whether or not the town in question is a member of another MPO. Each MPO receives Federal support determined by formula with required locally-sourced matching funds, towns not part of the Boston MPO but within the service district of another RTA are allowed to deduct their required local RTA contribution from their MBTA community assessment (fyi, assessments are deducted automatically by the State from a given town's share of "local aid"). Boston contribute upwards of $80 million per year - dancing around 50% of the total community assessed levy. Cambridge, the second most prolific payer (by far), commits upwards of $9 million. Arlington, Belmont, Brookline, Chelsea, Everett, Lynn, Malden, Medford, Milton, Newton, Peabody, Quincy, Revere, Somerville, Waltham, Watertown, and Weymouth all contribute at least $1 million. Metro Worcester, many Bristol County towns up to Brockton, and the Lowell/Lawrence area towns amongst other contribute no assessments to the MBTA despite receiving service. Towns in the former MTA Service District are still paying off bonds for MTA projects, but those will be fully-retired within 5 or 6 years I believe. The capital budget sources it's funds from the Commonwealth Transportation Fund - the State repository of fuel/excise taxes, Federal grants, and MBTA-revenue bonds. Gas-tax-based transit funding has been the standard OP at the Federal level since 1973 at least, and far from being a give-away to T riders, was actually supported by the highway lobby in the 70s because the Freeway Revolts prevented increasing congestion from being addressed by ploughing more expressways through urban areas and thus mass transit stepped in to preserve the highway network from impending suffocation.

EDIT: Also for Tangent, re: Somerville local funding of GLX. In the future, I'd like to see that happen, but not for GLX. Why? Well, there's currently no financial mechanism that allows cities to increase their local levies in any substantial manner due to Prop. 2 1/2 restrictions, except for a local ballot initiative. Even then, there's no financial mechanism to account for overruns. Municipalities in Massachusetts do not have significant financial authority or power and, while I'd love to see more local contribution, that can only happen when municipalities are allowed more financial autonomy and more control over transit projects. That's unappealing to suburban CR-users as the current financial system secures them an advantage in determining which projects go on the capital project ledger as they are comparatively over-represented in the General Court, but should greater authority over the MBTA be given to Boston and Cambridge, it would likely incur a shift of focus away from CR-expansion (added 100+ route miles over the past 15 years) and towards stagnant rapid transit improvements. For Somerville's case, they've been paying for rapid transit access since BERy instituted local assessments in the early 1900s, even though it lacked an in-town Station until the the 1980s. Nor are the ridiculous GLX cost overruns Somerville's fault (small, small exception: Brickbottom Condo Resis vs. MBTA maint yard tiff where Somerville advocated for relocation, ED). The State screwed up. The General Court screwed up. The MBTA screwed up. The EOT screwed up. MassDOT screwed up. Under no circumstances should Somerville get stuck with the bill (a bill they've been paying for over a century, fwiw) for the failure of the responsible agencies. In the future, like I said, more local contribution, more local control, but GLX is the State's responsibility. They need to do it.

So, that's the quick hits. I'm sure there's plenty of inaccuracies and missing points, but I think it's reasonable overview, but one I'm sure the ArchBoston brain trust can drastically improve. Like I said earlier, I'll do another post when I'm not staring down a glass of Jame-o about funding history of transit in Boston and the specs on how Copenhagen does it.
 
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So, part II. Here's how transit services are funded in Copenhagen. I want to be very clear that this isn't a "good Danes, bad New Englanders" write-up; Greater Copenhagen has an excellent transportation system, but it's not perfect, planners have made many mistakes, there are a multitude of problems in the way projects are selected for implementation, there're cost overruns and delays, and Boston, despite the resoundingly negative public opinion of the MBTA, does have one an extraordinary system all things taken together.

I'll do this in 3 parts: 1. services in Copenhagen, 2. relevant political entities, and 3. recent history and transit financing in practice.

1. What the system looks like today. Copenhagen (CPH, for the sake of brevity) has six major public transportation services. 1. The first is the national Danish railway network that connects Copenhagen with other, major Danish cities and with foreign cities. Currently, the Intra-Denmark high speed services connected Copenhagen with Odense (the 4th largest city), Aalborg (the third largest) and Aarhus (the second largest), 90 (travel time: 1 hour), 170 (3 hours), and 240 miles (4 hours) from CPH respectively. Trains run twice an hour along this route. Hamburg is also reachable within 7 hours, via a rail ferry, and Stockholm is accessible by an 8 hour trip. 2. There's the regional train network that functions in a similar capacity to the MBTA-CR. 3. There's a pseudo-Commuter Rail network known as Øresundståget, that services a major, historical rail-line to the north of Copenhagen known as Kystbanen (the Coast Line) and services the Swedish side of the Sound (the straight that separates CPH from Malmö, Sweden. "Øresundståget is derived from "Øresund" - the Danish name for the Sound - and "Tåget" - the Swedish word for train). 4. There's the regional bus network that covers Sjælland, the island that Copenhagen lies on, 5. There's a suburban railroad known as "S-Toget" that services the area 20 miles around CPH along radial lines with a circumferential route on the outskirts of the CPH. This service runs 5 mins at peak, 10 and 20 off-peak. 6. There's the Copenhagen Metro, which is a fully-automated light-rail, "mini-metro" system that serves Copenhagen and Frederiksberg (CPH's "Brookline") that runs 24/7 with 2 min peak, 5-7 off-peak, and 20 late night headways. Øresundståget, S-Toget, and the Metro form the backbone of urban/suburban transit network - together they constitute 195 annual riders along 154 route miles (2014 #s). For reference, the MBTA heavy- and light- rail and CR network accrued 273 million riders along 452 routes miles the same year. Residents in Copenhagen takes 3x as many annual PT trips per capita than Greater Boston. All of those six levels of services are managed by separated agencies, all at the national level with the exception of the bus network (regional level), and the Metro (separate, quasi-public institution).

2. There are 4, progressively larger geographically Danish political entities involved in transit financing. The smallest polity is the municipality, the second is the "region", the third are the national authorities, and the fourth is the EU. Municipalities in Denmark are generally larger than in New England, often constituting two or three major "towns". They aren't very large - we're talking as is Belmont, Watertown, and Arlington were one political entity, that's the scope. The Municipality of Copenhagen is, however, coterminous with the historical city of Copenhagen and is roughly the same size in population and area as Boston (CPH smaller by about 70k people). Unlike New England where municipal finances are grounded in property tax levies, Danish municipalities sources their funds from income taxes - this has resulted in less town vs. town competition, but then again, tax-levels are generally higher than in the US. The municipality of Copenhagen levied $4.5 billion from income taxes in 2015 with a total budget of $8.4 billion and a expense per capita of $15,000; Boston levied $1.9 bil from prop. taxes the same year with a total budget of $2.7 billion and a per-capita expense of $4,500. The next level of governance is the "region", which is relatively new in Denmark. "Regional" governments resemble "counties" somewhat, but they're primary responsibilities are to fund and manage the health care system in Denmark. There are two relevant regions for Copenhagen: Region Hovedstaden (the "Capital Region") and Region Sjælland (Denmark's Worcester County). Regional governments derive their funds from income taxes as well, and they do actually play a role in transportation financing as they fund the regional bus network. The national authorities in Denmark fund the commuter railroads and the S-Toget, the workhorse of rail transportation in Denmark. The EU does fund some TEN-T projects, but it's not really a present force in urban transportation.

3. The good stuff, how this works in practice. For this, I'll focus on the Copenhagen Metro ("Metroen" - the Metro) primarily. Despite it's contemporary fame, Denmark was not particularly successful economically or well-renowned at any point in the 20th century. The post-WWII era prosperity ended abruptly and acutely with the Oil Crises which shattered the Danish economy. The Center-Left governments of this era, despite their admirable goals, had coalesced around stagnant ideas - particularly the idea of "level development", or rather the idea the economic growth must be distributed across the country and not localized. Ironically, this left Copenhagen (a bastion of the center-left, well really a bastion of the far left) in the lurch and the city stagnated for a half-century. In the late 1980s, a center-right government came to power with some new ideas and new motivations. They looked out at the European landscape and observed that successful 1990s-era European economies generally had a focal point, a city - usually a capital - that both heralded the success of a given country and also served at the spear-tip in entering an increasingly globalized economy. Copenhagen was to be Denmark's "engine", and thus this government began the process that would eventually result in Metroen.

There were three primary goals. The first was to connect Frederiksberg with central Copenhagen. Frederiksberg contains about 100k people within a solidly urban form, but is political distinct from Copenhagen. It's also rich. But in 1990, despite it's close geographical connection to Copenahagen, Frederiskberg lacked a high-capacity transit service to the core - it used to have a railroad, but as Copenhagen grew during the latter-half of the 19th century, the ROWs were slowly shifted and reestablished. Frederiksberg lost is RR connection, but gained a streetcar connection which disappeared in the late 1950s (basically it was Beacon St in Brookline without the trolley). The second, arguably more salient motivation, was real estate development. Copenhagen's harbor hosted industry, but most had disappeared, withered, or moved during the mid-20th century, leaving significant amounts of land close to the urban core, but completely unintegrated with normal city functions. Of particular interest to the 1990s center-right government was an area known as Ørestad, not a former port area, but a former military installation to the southwest of Copenhagen's core that was completely barren - it was, literally, grazing ground for cows. Surplus to military requirements, the government, along with municipality of Copenhagen purchased the area, and readied it for the construction of totally new residential, institutional, and commercial district close to the core. Metroen would be new city-area's connection. The third motivation was to reach the airport, to the southeast of CPH.

To accomplish these goals, the government established three "interest companies" - essentially governmental non-profits with expanded but narrow authority over transit service design/construction and land development. In metro Boston is would be similar to BRA-MBTA interagency. Each interest company aligned with the three stated goals above: Frederiksbergbaneselskabet (WARNING: Danish is an agglutinative language, words can get long. That means "Frederiksberg Railway Company") for the Frederiksberg-CPH link, Østamagerbaneselskabet for the airport link, and Ørestadsselskabet (ØS) for the Ørestad link and which also served as the over-arching organizing organizing for Metroen as a whole. These companies were funded by three means: national subsidies (at first, later Metro projects generally don't/didn't rely on national largesse), municipal funds, and the sale of development rights. ØS employed the "new town" principle in securing funds for development: build infra to raise the value of a neighborhood's land, sell that land to secure more funds for infra, rinse/repeat. They were able to do this effectively as they controlled both disposition of land and design/construction of the infrastructure.

Once the first three segments were finished (2002, link to airport in 2007), the state reorganized this structure. The land disposition authority was folded into another, Copenhagen-run agency similar to the BRA and the transit responsibilities were assumed by a quasi-public authority, though the fund-by-development model was retained and continues to this day to act as the primary funding mechanism for the development of the Copenhagen metro. And there has been quite a development. There are currently three additional metro projects underway in Copenhagen, with the final system expected to be ready for full-use in 2025. If the timeline is observed (it probably won't be, but for the sake of comparison), then Copenhagen will have added 27 totally grade-separated route miles (60% in bored tunnels), 46 stations (most in underground caverns), at a cost of $9 billion USD. Currently 56 million people ride the Metro per year, but with full completion (particularly of the "City-Ring" an inner-core, subterranean circumferential ring route) the ridership will, almost assuredly, top out over 100 million per year. To put this in perspective, in 25 years, Copenhagen built the Green Line. And that's not the only transit project in the metro area.

Now. There are many criticisms to heed. The first is that, while the Metro allowed for the development of Ørestad (and under-construction extensions to the former port areas of Copenhagen are pursuing a similar goal), it did not service the traditional concentrations of population outside of the core. There's a very substantial north-south access in Copenhagen running from the northern districts to Amager in the south that is serviced by the 5A bus, the bus with the highest ridership in Northern Europe and more trafficked than any single bus corridor in Boston, that was completely ignored by Metroen, despite the fact that these areas, more so than any other, could have supported improved access. Despite Metro's steadily increasing ridership tallies, the brunt of commuters in Copenhagen are still carried by S-Toget (the "S-Bahn" so to speak of Copenhagen), a system that is wonderful but has not been improved much in the last 25 years, despite there being a broader and (most likely) more substantial return on investment in improving this service. Metro projects have go over-budget. They have been delayed as well. Project management has, at times, been piss-poor. Sometimes it errs a little too close to "vanity project" for comfort.

So that's an overview (and, scarily, I kept that short). But there are some key points to take away. The first is the importance of municipal authorities. It's not just about funds. Yes, Copenhagen has more money than Boston - but more importantly, Copenhagen has more institutional authority than Boston. It can instigate transit improvements without having to go through a General Court. Municipalities also frequently combine their funds with others to achieve greater economies of scale - a ring of 11 separate municipalities at the outer-fringe of Copenhagen are currently funding a 27 mile light line connection the S-Tog radials in their respective districts. It's far simpler than GLX, but then again, it's projected to cost 22x less per mile than our lovely project. Project design, approval, and execution is also far more streamlined. This is partially the result of Danes' lack of fear of bureaucracy, the public comments process is much more restricted than in the US and generally completed within 7 or 8 months. However, the greater financial and institutional authority of Danish municipalities also lends a much greater level of security and of agency to transit projects - decisions can be made more quickly, more openly as each municipality actually has the ability to call up funds for these sorts of projects. That's in contrast the, generally decades-long, process of building coalitions in State and Federal representations in order to secure funding for projects in Massachusetts.
 
EDIT: Also for Tangent, re: Somerville local funding of GLX. In the future, I'd like to see that happen, but not for GLX. Why? Well, there's currently no financial mechanism that allows cities to increase their local levies in any substantial manner due to Prop. 2 1/2 restrictions, except for a local ballot initiative. Even then, there's no financial mechanism to account for overruns. Municipalities in Massachusetts do not have significant financial authority or power and, while I'd love to see more local contribution, that can only happen when municipalities are allowed more financial autonomy and more control over transit projects. That's unappealing to suburban CR-users as the current financial system secures them an advantage in determining which projects go on the capital project ledger as they are comparatively over-represented in the General Court, but should greater authority over the MBTA be given to Boston and Cambridge, it would likely incur a shift of focus away from CR-expansion (added 100+ route miles over the past 15 years) and towards stagnant rapid transit improvements. For Somerville's case, they've been paying for rapid transit access since BERy instituted local assessments in the early 1900s, even though it lacked an in-town Station until the the 1980s. Nor are the ridiculous GLX cost overruns Somerville's fault (small, small exception: Brickbottom Condo Resis vs. MBTA maint yard tiff where Somerville advocated for relocation, ED). The State screwed up. The General Court screwed up. The MBTA screwed up. The EOT screwed up. MassDOT screwed up. Under no circumstances should Somerville get stuck with the bill (a bill they've been paying for over a century, fwiw) for the failure of the responsible agencies. In the future, like I said, more local contribution, more local control, but GLX is the State's responsibility. They need to do it.

Sorry for the delay responding, I've had limited time the last week or so.

But I mostly agree that to change funding formulas mid stream for GLX would be half baked right now.

In the GLX thread I believe I said something about Somerville covering the difference if the state falls short and Somerville wants to push the full build forward with stations built as previously designed, for instance. I think they could probably do so with some sort of Tax Incentive Financing for Union Square, at least, because Union Square has a fairly advanced redevelopment plan which could be used to help subsidize that station if needed.

Looking at GLX financing, that would be more ad hoc funding than I think was intended for this discussion thread.

More generally, I also agree with the prop 2 1/2 exclusion for the local assessments. If the MBTA local assessments go up to where I think they need to go, meaning increased somewhere between double and ten times, then there would need to be a state law that both upped the local MBTA assessments and excluded those assessments from prop 2 1/2. Like most tax hikes I doubt it would be popular though, so there is that. Perhaps the local assessments could be combined with MBTA discounts for local residents that the local government could hand out to their residents as a way to reduce the sting. At least that way residents of non-MBA towns and other out of towners would be paying full fares while taxpayers already subsidizing the MBTA would get some tangible benefit.
 

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