Re: The Boston Arch (Aquarium parking garage)
All apologies in advance for continuing this discussion. My opinion is based only upon a quick glance at the relevant issues. I could be wrong. This should be moved to the general section etc. etc.
That opinion is a bit misleading as it was specifically responsive to a proposed House bill that called for the taking of land and construction of a ballpark. The crux of the opinion is that the development of a stadium is not sufficient to establish a public purpose absent any controls ensuring that it is not a bad faith taking.
A more detailed description of the issues provided that:
As the SJC made clear in Providence and Worcester R.R. Co. v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd. 453 Mass. 135 (2009) makes clear
And as Toby mentioned
As such, the land could probably be taken, and according to the 1969 Opinion, these municipal purposes could include:
All apologies in advance for continuing this discussion. My opinion is based only upon a quick glance at the relevant issues. I could be wrong. This should be moved to the general section etc. etc.
That opinion is a bit misleading as it was specifically responsive to a proposed House bill that called for the taking of land and construction of a ballpark. The crux of the opinion is that the development of a stadium is not sufficient to establish a public purpose absent any controls ensuring that it is not a bad faith taking.
On the other hand, if the legislation itself contains standards and principles governing and guiding the operation of the facilities in a manner which reasonably can be expected adequately (a) to protect all aspects of the public interest and (b) to guard against improper diversion of public funds and privileges for the benefit of private persons and entities, then such enterprises may be found to be for public objectives.
A more detailed description of the issues provided that:
In the light of the foregoing discussion we comment more directly on the individual questions. As to Question 6 we entertain no doubt that bonds may be issued to pay the cost of a stadium complex and arena, if adequate principles, standards, and safeguards governing the execution of the project are included in the enabling legislation to make the project one for a public purpose. As to Questions 7 and 8 we are of opinion that the auxiliary and incidental activities and functions mentioned in the questions may be included in a project if they are to be conducted under adequate statutory standards, and that leases and concessions may be negotiated and effected in accordance with such standards, if they are provided. As to Questions 9 and 15, under suitable statutory standards, provision of facilities in aid of a proper public purpose will not be rendered unconstitutional simply because individuals or private entities, as such, incidentally may profit. See Opinion of the Justices, 354 Mass. 779, —-, 236 N.E.2d 523,FND and cases cited. We think that the existence of a proper public purpose will not be destroyed if the Authority makes proper leases of the stadium complex or the arena (pursuant to a statute containing appropriate standards) to a privately owned entity operating for profit. Indeed such leases may be essential to obtaining the revenues with which to pay the proposed bonds. See City of Boston v. Merchants Natl. Bank, 338 Mass. 245, 249, 154 N.E.2d 702. The lease of State owned or State financed facilities to private enterprises is not a novelty. See e.g. the situations considered in Dehydrating Process Co. of Gloucester, Inc. v. City of Gloucester, 334 Mass. 287, 135 N.E.2d 20; Gloucester Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Assessors of Gloucester, 337 Mass. 23, 147 N.E.2d 820, and Board of Assessors of Newton v. Pickwick Ltd., Inc., 351 Mass. 621, 223 N.E.2d 388, and cases cited in these three decisions. As to Questions 10 and 16, if House No. 5486 should be in fact revised to include such statutory principles and standards as will make the construction and operation of the stadium and arena for a proper public purpose, we are of opinion that the Authority may be granted both power to take land by eminent domain and tax exemption. See Dodge v. Prudential Ins. Co., 343 Mass. 375, 383—384, 179 N.E.2d 234.
As the SJC made clear in Providence and Worcester R.R. Co. v. Energy Facilities Siting Bd. 453 Mass. 135 (2009) makes clear
...we consider the statutory text itself, [delegating the State's authority to use eminent domain] "the principal source of insight into Legislative purpose." (citations omitted).
And as Toby mentioned
General Laws c.40, s.14 authorizes the City Council to vote to take by eminent domain under G.L. c. 79 “any land, easement or right therein within the city or town not already appropriated to public use, for any municipal purpose for which the . . . taking of land, easement or right therein is not otherwise authorized or directed by statute.”
As such, the land could probably be taken, and according to the 1969 Opinion, these municipal purposes could include:
supplying housing, slum clearance, mass transportation, highways and vehicular tunnels, educational facilities and other necessities...even where there may be involved arrangements with private persons or entities operating for profit.