Teban54
Senior Member
- Joined
- Nov 13, 2021
- Messages
- 1,126
- Reaction score
- 2,799
While you certainly brought up a very valid point, I think the opposite may also be true though: how much more deterioration has happened since July 2021 that were not captured by this report?I will note that everything in that slide deck is "as of July 1 2021" as in two and a half years ago. It seems counterproductive to release something like this so far after the data point because by now it doesn't capture the current state of the system. The 2019 report used 2018 data which was at least more timely. There's a lot of leakage, which makes it hard to use this as a starting point - granted, this sort of analysis has to be looking back, and can't really be done on the fly, but refreshing the asset list for more accurate assessment should have been possible.
For example, a healthy chunk of the CR signal work looks like it would have been done as part of the ongoing Northside ATC work, and the transit section doesn't capture even the Orange Line surge or anything in flight or delivered after July 2021, including GLX. That means something like the Gloucester drawbridge or hundreds of new/ rebuilt buses that have been delivered are still in that CNIA as needing replacement, when in fact it's been done.
That's not to say the T doesn't need to clean up how it does things - I'm just saying this analysis is so delayed as to be confusing the issue.
Considering that widespread slow zones were only introduced last year and especially this year (which indicates track faults that went undetected before then), I wonder if the rapid transit tracks are in even worse shape than the report stated, at least as of September 2023 when systemwide slow zones were at their peak.