General MBTA Topics (Multi Modal, Budget, MassDOT)

[Stlin]

I will note that everything in that slide deck is "as of July 1 2021" as in two and a half years ago. It seems counterproductive to release something like this so far after the data point because by now it doesn't capture the current state of the system. The 2019 report used 2018 data which was at least more timely. There's a lot of leakage, which makes it hard to use this as a starting point - granted, this sort of analysis has to be looking back, and can't really be done on the fly, but refreshing the asset list for more accurate assessment should have been possible.

For example, a healthy chunk of the CR signal work looks like it would have been done as part of the ongoing Northside ATC work, and the transit section doesn't capture even the Orange Line surge or anything in flight or delivered after July 2021, including GLX. That means something like the Gloucester drawbridge or hundreds of new/ rebuilt buses that have been delivered are still in that CNIA as needing replacement, when in fact it's been done.

That's not to say the T doesn't need to clean up how it does things - I'm just saying this analysis is so delayed as to be confusing the issue.

 

[737900er]

I will note that everything in that slide deck is "as of July 1 2021" as in two and a half years ago. It seems counterproductive to release something like this so far after the data point because by now it doesn't capture the current state of the system. The 2019 report used 2018 data which was at least more timely. There's a lot of leakage, which makes it hard to use this as a starting point - granted, this sort of analysis has to be looking back, and can't really be done on the fly, but refreshing the asset list for more accurate assessment should have been possible.

For example, a healthy chunk of the CR signal work looks like it would have been done as part of the ongoing Northside ATC work, and the transit section doesn't capture even the Orange Line surge or anything in flight or delivered after July 2021, including GLX. That means something like the Gloucester drawbridge is still in that CNIA as needing work, when in fact it's done.

That's not to say the T doesn't need to clean up how it does things - I'm just saying this analysis is so delayed as to be confusing the issue.

The "Not in SGR" category also include many items that are already planned to be addressed like all the bus garages, old Orange/Red Line cars, etc.

 

[Teban54]

I will note that everything in that slide deck is "as of July 1 2021" as in two and a half years ago. It seems counterproductive to release something like this so far after the data point because by now it doesn't capture the current state of the system. The 2019 report used 2018 data which was at least more timely. There's a lot of leakage, which makes it hard to use this as a starting point - granted, this sort of analysis has to be looking back, and can't really be done on the fly, but refreshing the asset list for more accurate assessment should have been possible.

For example, a healthy chunk of the CR signal work looks like it would have been done as part of the ongoing Northside ATC work, and the transit section doesn't capture even the Orange Line surge or anything in flight or delivered after July 2021, including GLX. That means something like the Gloucester drawbridge or hundreds of new/ rebuilt buses that have been delivered are still in that CNIA as needing replacement, when in fact it's been done.

That's not to say the T doesn't need to clean up how it does things - I'm just saying this analysis is so delayed as to be confusing the issue.

While you certainly brought up a very valid point, I think the opposite may also be true though: how much more deterioration has happened since July 2021 that were not captured by this report?

Considering that widespread slow zones were only introduced last year and especially this year (which indicates track faults that went undetected before then), I wonder if the rapid transit tracks are in even worse shape than the report stated, at least as of September 2023 when systemwide slow zones were at their peak.

 

[Jahvon09]

Why am I not surprised?

MBTA says 2/3 of assets are beyond useful life - CommonWealth Beacon

Roughly two-thirds of the MBTA’s assets are beyond their useful life and would cost $24.5 billion to bring into a state of good repair, according to a new analysis of the transit authority’s infrastructure.

commonwealthbeacon.org

 

[bakgwailo]

I don't get this report. Much of the seemingly big-ticket items seem to have been in progress for a while now.

The Orange and Red Line signal systems are supposed to be completely replaced (although this seems stalled and years behind schedule), which is $592m out of the $753m total. Aren't the Green signals also slated to be replaced under the Type 10/GLT project? Isn't most of that money already spent on the Orange/Red? Last update emails I got on the projects seemed at least some work on them had been done on various parts of the line.

Commuter rail signals? Wasn't this done with the system-wide implementation of PTC? That's a good $1B in the budget.

Rolling stock, we already have the (rather failed, admittedly) Red and Orange full fleet replacement orders (kind of) underway. The line item is just heavy rail, but has it at $607m - are they referencing the Blue needing to be replaced? The Orange and Red orders are already paid for, I thought. Light rail is only $143m, but, again the Type-10 Order (which I assume, again is funded already) takes care of that (for the green line and HSL).

Tracks (heavy + light rapid transit) are at $2B, but... haven't they just replaced a ton of track in the last 2 years? Didn't we just have a plan put forward to bring all the rapid transit tracks back up to speed by the end of next year?

For power - again, wasn't this all supposed to have been upgraded and replaced under the OLT and RLT in the last 5 years? Heavy rail is at $2.7B, and I can't imagine that is all the Blue Line. Light rail is $1.1B, although, I thought this had already been budgeted for the Type 10/GLT. So, again, shouldn't most of this have already been budgeted/spent and underway in some fashion?

Facilities? Aren't they rebuilding/have rebuilt the maintenance yards for the Red and Orange, again, as part of their respective transformation projects? I have emails on weekly progress reports of this work the T was putting out. As already pointed out, too, the bus facilities are also about to be fully rehabbed.

That's a big chunk of the super scary $25B price tag. However, I will circle back to what is going on with the rest of the Orange and Red transformation projects? The spectacularly bad rolling stock procurement seems to be shrouding the seemingly equally bad signal upgrade and power station upgrades (I thought that was all done on the Orange at this point, too).

I don't think this kind of thing is at all helpful for the MBTA to put out there in this format. This report should include all of the current projects, statuses, and price tags that affect the SGR, along with some sort of forward-looking plan as to how to address the remaining issues and their severity. High-level projects would be fine. As it stands pumping this out there is just fodder for the press and everyone else. Does anyone else remember Baker talking about the backlog when it was supposedly $6-7B and how they had made big dents in it with the transformation projects? Shocking the number gets more than tripled as soon as he is out of office.

 

[TheRatmeister]

While you certainly brought up a very valid point, I think the opposite may also be true though: how much more deterioration has happened since July 2021 that were not captured by this report?

Considering that widespread slow zones were only introduced last year and especially this year (which indicates track faults that went undetected before then), I wonder if the rapid transit tracks are in even worse shape than the report stated, at least as of September 2023 when systemwide slow zones were at their peak.

Even if most of the tracks are in worse shape I'm not sure that would actually inflate the cost, given that they already included replacing basically all of it in that $25 billion price tag.

 

[Highwayguy]

Taking the $24.5B figure at face value, this is beyond insane. Apart from the obvious (and hilarious) comparison to the Big Dig at $24.3B, the cost of just repairing the T could buy Boston an entire Orange line’s worth of new subway at Second Ave costs, London’s Crossrail network, or (incase Connecticut starts getting uppity or something) TWO super aircraft carriers.

One of two things are true:

The existing plant is so decrepit and cost control is so nonexistent that just repairing the network is actually this expensive, and there is 0% hope of network expansion ever, or:

This is a fundamentally flawed report that never should have seen the light of day whose authors should be fired.

Both are beyond inexcusable.

 

[Teban54]

and there is 0% hope of network expansion ever

I'd argue against that. Compared to the $24.5b (at face value) for state of good repair, the <$1b to build Red-Blue Connector suddenly seems like a drop in the bucket.

In addition, I doubt that federal grants that support extension projects (like SAS) can be used for system maintenance, but someone can correct me.

 

[ritchiew]

I think the big takeaway is this, from those slides:

The MBTA’s assets continue to age faster than they are being replaced, resulting in an increase in the total number of assets that are out of a State of Good Repair.

They can't keep up with the growing backlog, and haven't been able to in a long while. This ought to be a call for a major change in how the MBTA is funded.

 

[Highwayguy]

I'd argue against that. Compared to the $24.5b (at face value) for state of good repair, the <$1b to build Red-Blue Connector suddenly seems like a drop in the bucket.

In addition, I doubt that federal grants that support extension projects (like SAS) can be used for system maintenance, but someone can correct me.

Drop in the bucket comparatively, agreed. However, spending a billion on network expansion when there is a $24.5B albatross of a repair backlog hanging overhead would be a pretty clear cut misallocation of finite resources.

Its like the old idiom of the guy living in a shack buying a giant inground pool instead of fixing the leaky roof; except in the T’s case the shack and the pool are built on top of an erupting volcano.

 

[beck4537]

At what point does it become cheaper to start all over again? Feels like for $25 billion we could literally build brand new stations and utilize maglev VS what we have today.

 

[Teban54]

Drop in the bucket comparatively, agreed. However, spending a billion on network expansion when there is a $24.5B albatross of a repair backlog hanging overhead would be a pretty clear cut misallocation of finite resources.

Its like the old idiom of the guy living in a shack buying a giant inground pool instead of fixing the leaky roof; except in the T’s case the shack and the pool are built on top of an erupting volcano.

I'll refer back to this comment that I made weeks ago:

The current shitshow on maintenance and service quality was because the T didn't do proper maintenance for so long, to the point where nobody knows how to do it and the institutional knowledge is totally lost.

The same also applies to network expansions and planning.

Keeping a stream of extension projects under design and/or construction ensures that people don't forget how to do them. We had that happen before GLX, which was why things were so out of whack there until John Dalton had to come along and bring in the knowledge to do transit projects. Let's not lose that until another generation is gone.

 

[Highwayguy]

Just my personal opinion, but I've always had issues with this kind of mindset because:

The current shitshow on maintenance and service quality was because the T didn't do proper maintenance for so long, to the point where nobody knows how to do it and the institutional knowledge is totally lost.

The same also applies to network expansions and planning.

Keeping a stream of extension projects under design and/or construction ensures that people don't forget how to do them. We had that happen before GLX, which was why things were so out of whack there until John Dalton had to come along and bring in the knowledge to do transit projects. Let's not lose that until another generation is gone.

----------------

As an aside, I'll also note that her attitude isn't "we'll fix the maintenance first and come back to expansions later". It's "we won't do expansions ever again, because other similar cities have stopped doing so". Which is a complete lie, seeing Boston's GLX, NYC's Second Ave Subway and IBX, DC's Silver Line extension, Purple Line and Bloop, Chicago's Red Line Extension, Philly's Roosevelt Blvd Subway etc are either just completed, in construction or started planning recently.

Full agree on the pressing need/ organizational inertia for expansion. Personally, lm leaning towards thinking (hoping?) this report is over estimated shelf art. But if its not, in a world of finite resources, how is it responsible to spend a billion to extend the BL to Charles if the redline is still slower than walking from Bowdin to Kendall?

Despite how my posts may come across, I am still a transit optimist and evangelist. But the T has not made that an easy opinion to have the last few years. As someone who has been persuaded by the Alon Levy school of thought, getting these scandalous costs under control and having an institution capable of maintaining the existing network in a usable state are paramount.

 

[bakgwailo]

For people saying we can rebuild the entire system for this: the number is inclusive of not only the entire subway (light+heavy rail), but also the Commuter Rail, the entire bus network, and all the support/maintenance systems for them. SGR also has various degrees of priority and need: just because something falls out of SGR doesn't mean it isn't still functional. It also isn't going to be $25B upfront all right now. I would expect, again, the MBTA to come up with a 5 or 10-year plan to address this would be $5b to $2.5B a year over that time period. This brings me back to my original rant: is it even really $25B when a seemingly whole bunch of this stuff is already underway and paid for?

 

[ritchiew]

is it even really $25B when a seemingly whole bunch of this stuff is already underway and paid for?

It seems they're doing the inventory this way in part so it's easier to compare to past inventories and see what the trajectory is. They just need a simple and standardized way of doing it so it can be compared year to year, and so they take a snapshot of exactly what they actually have at a given point in time. They don't count things that are already planned for, budgeted for, or bought because any of those things could still get delayed, dropped, or show up defective, and that would screw up the comparisons over time. This seems like a reasonable way to measure this, as long as they give those caveats of what exactly gets counted, which they do.

As for why their snapshot date for this inventory is from mid-2021, I don't know. I think this report is just really late. Which is bad.

Directly to your question, is the true figure $25B? No. It's almost certainly higher. You're right that there is this long list of things that have been fixed, but MBTA is also really clear that the system is deteriorating faster than stuff is getting repaired. That's the trajectory we're on. So if the true figure was $25B as of 2021, it's probably higher now.

 

[HenryAlan]

At what point does it become cheaper to start all over again? Feels like for $25 billion we could literally build brand new stations and utilize maglev VS what we have today.

What we really need is $50 billion. $25B for state of good repair, $25B to convert the commuter rail in to rapid urban rail (including North-South Rail). Only then, would we have something that could be considered world class.

 

[Delvin4519]

Again, another motorway burned to the ground, this time in California. The freeway is fixed again and will be up and running in less than 1 WEEK!!! Yet fixing all of these slowzones on the MBTA Red Line will take over 1.5 years!!!

Both Philly and Los Angeles somehow figured out how to rebuild a burnt-to-the-ground motorway bridge in 2 weeks or less so drivers can pollute the city, yet these MBTA slowzones persist for years and years and years before getting fixed.

By the time the last slowzone on the MBTA is fixed by January 1st, 2025, Eng will have been running the T for over 20 months. It was June 2022 when the MBTA was ordered to cut subway service and began stacking slowzone on top of another on the Red Line. Greater than 2.5 years of slowzones on the Red Line, June 2022 -> January 1st, 2025.

 

[Mother Brook]

I think this is the first hint someone in this administration is hinting at changes in revenue sourcing... Positive direction, but 7 months isn't enough time to get things in place..

Yes. Down in DC Randy Clarke and the WMATA board has been sounding alarm bells for the last month plus. The MA Leg sleepwalking here is going to have bad consequences. Most likely they will pass something at the last minute and it will be thrown together because any new dedicated revenue which the T really needs will need a lot more time.

 

[Delvin4519]

Most likely they will pass something at the last minute and it will be thrown together because any new dedicated revenue which the T really needs will need a lot more time.

They'll wait until 11:57 p.m. on June 30th, 2024 to throw something at the T. Yet the T would probably be cutting bus service again in June 2024 since they wouldn't know yet.

 

[millerm277]

Again, another motorway burned to the ground, this time in California. The freeway is fixed again and will be up and running in less than 1 WEEK!!! Yet fixing all of these slowzones on the MBTA Red Line will take over 1.5 years!!!

Both Philly and Los Angeles somehow figured out how to rebuild a burnt-to-the-ground motorway bridge in 2 weeks or less so drivers can pollute the city, yet these MBTA slowzones persist for years and years and years before getting fixed.

By the time the last slowzone on the MBTA is fixed by January 1st, 2025, Eng will have been running the T for over 20 months. It was June 2022 when the MBTA was ordered to cut subway service and began stacking slowzone on top of another on the Red Line. Greater than 2.5 years of slowzones on the Red Line, June 2022 -> January 1st, 2025.

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A few thoughts:

- First, in neither case was the road "fixed". Repaired enough to mostly reopen with temporary measures while a long-term rebuilding happens for the actually permanent fix, yes. Both have had/will have many lane closures and other disruptions by the time they're truly fixed in many months or years. Philly just completed the first permanent replacement span this month, 5 months after the accident, and still needs to build another and then rebuild the Cottman Ave on-ramp (which hasn't reopened at all) underneath - it'll probably be a year from the accident by the time it's fully fixed and open to traffic on permanent structures.

- These were a single small site of disaster to focus all available resources on, as opposed to a widespread maintenance problem. If 75% of the highways in the Philly area were in rough enough shape in terms of paving to force drivers to slow down significantly and to have crews doing emergency patching constantly just to keep them from swallowing up cars....that'd be a more similar situation to the MBTA. It doesn't matter how big a budget you have, you aren't repaving/reconstructing all of that highway in a few weeks.

- The MBTA can certainly fix a single small slow zone in a short period of time with a focused effort.

- To some extent, it arguably shows that disaster recovery is easier when things were in good shape beforehand. That section of I-95 in Philadelphia had been fully reconstructed in 2016, and while I can't find info on the CA bridge, street view for it looks like something that was in a pretty good state of repair both from above and below. They do not have to worry that they're going to find lots more problems than those directly caused by the disaster which will have to be addressed as well.

- Economies of scale are a thing. We build a lot of roads, there are a lot of people who know how to work on roads - if you're willing to cut a large enough check to get people off other projects, there's a vast pool of contractors, labor, expertise and materials out there. The same is not exactly true for those qualified to work on transit systems. If we had more of it, there'd also be a larger pool of all those things to work with.