Green Line Extension to Medford & Union Sq

I don't see how those 5 stations wouldn't justify themselves based on ridership estimates that I have seen I would think they will get at least as many passengers as the most heavily used surface stops on the branches and will certainly have higher ridership than the D Line stops so how are they not justified?

This extension if built will have the highest ridership per mile of any light rail line in the country with even some heavy rail subways having lower ridership per mile.
 
I don't see how those 5 stations wouldn't justify themselves based on ridership estimates that I have seen I would think they will get at least as many passengers as the most heavily used surface stops on the branches and will certainly have higher ridership than the D Line stops so how are they not justified?

This extension if built will have the highest ridership per mile of any light rail line in the country with even some heavy rail subways having lower ridership per mile.

Because the D Line doesn't justify itself at this cost either. We're lucky we have it already, because apparently it would cost $6 Billion to build today...
 
But speaking of cost. As you said Equilibria, the new estimate assumes the same inflation the previous contractor was doing. We just found to way to reduce it back down to a price we can accept while keeping the contractor graft. Theorectially, if we go after the graft, the estimate should be much lower.

So far, it is acknowledged and implied in things like the report, but if we going to go after it. Are we going to go after it? Are we just ¯\_(ツ)_/¯ at the contractor fraud?

There are tons of activist on this too. Some groups have mentioned it as I recall from the public comments, but most are more focus on keeping it alive at all - an understandable reason. But it is in our interest that the estimate don't include the graft. It starve off future challenges to kill it. Help the chance of future projects of BLX or NSRL be done in our lifetime by not giving opposition material. It may even give us the ability to bring back some cut features (like sidewalks for Broadway, Community Path not going on the McGrath Hwy, or having fare gates).

But needs to be explicit, so are there any signs it will go that direction? Ways to push besides public comments?
 
First, the Commonwealth isn't realizing revenue on that property per se - it's been traded to the Northpoint developer in exchange for the land on which the new station sits. It's value is already included in the ROW portion of the budget.

Got it, wasn't aware of that. I thought it was going on the MBTA parking lot across the street. ($6 for all-day parking, cash only, by the way).
 
Got it, wasn't aware of that. I thought it was going on the MBTA parking lot across the street. ($6 for all-day parking, cash only, by the way).

No. Northpoint was all former rail yard owned by Pan Am. Pan Am was the one who hired all the developers for Northpoint to parcel that unused property off. GLX was being planned long before Northpoint ever was, and Pan Am knew this. So when it started getting its internal house in order on hiring developers, it started talking to the state about GLX. Because that new Lechmere station and all the new outbound stops SERIOUSLY increases the land value of the development they were about to embark on.

So it took shape as a land swap: the state gets all the land it would ever need in ex- freight yard territory for GLX, Assembly Square station (which is on ex- Pan Am property), and the Brickbottom yards complex. They threw in two mothballed train yards in downtown Lowell for redevelopment...pretty much free-of-charge since they need some environmental remediation before they become pretty nice redev parcels next to the river. They threw in lifetime trackage rights on their track to Concord, NH, Wachusett, and Plaistow, NH for commuter rail future considerations, and lifetime trackage rights on the Worcester-Ayer branch for that day in the future when the Grand Junction has to be taken for the Urban Ring (purely transactional and cost-neutral, but it's forever). As well as agreeing to up their self-funding stake in the very lucrative Patriot Corridor freight project, so MassDOT really doesn't have to spend very much at all to get a competing corridor with the CSX/B&A projects they spent shitloads on. And they agreed to re-streetscape Lechmere Square out-of-pocket.

In return, all Pan Am wanted was to be deeded the old Lechmere station parcel to build something tallish on while Northpoint's building boom was going hot. To have some sort of design control over the Lechmere streetscaping (to bait the parcel developer into shooting for the moon). To get some sort of affirmative on whether GLX was real or not. And to get a basic scratch-your-back/scratch-mine agreement to be nice and cooperative on mundane Northpoint-related things like hashing out the traffic patterns, utility hookups, and whatnot. Which means if this thing gets shitcanned you'll probably still see Lechmere relocated in the closeout costs as a good-faith gesture to all that wheeling-and-dealing.



The state made out like bandits in that swap. It was BAFFLING how much Pan Am undersold that huge a quantity of acreage. I mean...the Lechmere Sq. site is nicely situated and all and ties the room together , but it's only big enough for one self-contained structure of probably no more than 6-10 stories. It's not that extraordinary a money-maker.

If nothing ever comes of this whole tortured saga except for punting Lechmere across the street, the state still got outstanding return--and revenue pumped back into the economy--on one cost-neutral land swap of old train yards for other old train yards. Maybe not so much value in what it aimed to do after making that land-swap, depending on how this show ends...but the land swap in isolation was a very good haul.
 
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So, if I'm getting this right, the project is estimated to cost $2,289 million, of which approximately $701 million has already been spent, $1,000 million is coming from the Feds (contingent on the project finishing), and $75 million is coming from Camberville governments (contingent on the project finishing). As everyone who has ever played poker or taken an intro to economics course should know, sunk costs should not be figured into decision making. Those costs have already been spent regardless of the outcome of the decision, so they don't matter one way or another. That means that the question, as far as the Commonwealth/MBTA is concerned, should come down to this:

Should we spend $513 million new dollars for a seven station, 4.7 mile Green Line extension plus a new maintenance facility or should we walk away?

To me, this seems like a no-brainer. Yes, $2.3 billion is a ridiculous number, but the Commonwealth/MBTA in making their decision should only care about their marginal cost and their marginal benefit. And the marginal cost to the Commonwealth/MBTA in this situation really isn't very large relative to the marginal benefit of the finished extension. Charlie Baker shouldn't care about the $1 billion in federal money, $75 million in municipal money, or $701 million in spent money because he doesn't get to spend those funds on anything else if he cancels the project.

Now, there is also the question of whether the project will actually have a total (not marginal) cost of $2.3 billion, and whether that is an over- or under-estimation, but that is a totally different question.

JumboBuc -- a few flaws in your analysis:
1) some of the sunk costs are for the vehicles which you will need eventually even if you don't build the GLX
2) some of the sunk cost is real estate -- at least some of which could be recouped through outright sales or leasing arrangements
3) some of the construction work already completed or in process relates to improvements and fixes that will make the CR more robust and in a better state of repair

So in reality not all that much of the sunk costs are just lost if you cancel GLX

The challenge now is to make sure that the new estimates are realistic [not low-balled like the original Patrick Administration numbers] and that costs can be kept under control during the 4 years of construction

The world sliding closer to a recession should relieve some pressure on materials and even on equipment rentals -- but as long as Boston is booming and the idea of letting the Unions fix the labor costs -- the Big Digish aspects of this project will persist
 
JumboBuc -- a few flaws in your analysis:
[...]
So in reality not all that much of the sunk costs are just lost if you cancel GLX
"Sunk cost" != "wasted cost". A cost is "sunk" when it's already been spent and can't/won't be recouped, even if it yields a benefit.

1) some of the sunk costs are for the vehicles which you will need eventually even if you don't build the GLX
This only strengthens my point. These costs are sunk (i.e. they've already been spent) and will go to pay for new vehicles whether or not the project goes forward. Thus, the sunk vehicle costs should not be considered when trying to decide whether or not the project should go forward. This isn't a flaw...

2) some of the sunk cost is real estate -- at least some of which could be recouped through outright sales or leasing arrangements
This is a valid point. I thought of this, but didn't bother to write it out. The state could recoup some of their already spent real estate expenditure, so that does add to the variable cost a bit. This also goes to the CSTH / Equilibria / F-Line discussion regarding the Lechmere land.

3) some of the construction work already completed or in process relates to improvements and fixes that will make the CR more robust and in a better state of repair
Again, this is not a flaw. Sunk costs are sunk, even if they yield a benefit. The already spent cost of commuter rail improvements should not be considered when deciding whether or not the Green Line Extension should go forward.
 
JumboBuc -- a few flaws in your analysis:
1) some of the sunk costs are for the vehicles which you will need eventually even if you don't build the GLX
2) some of the sunk cost is real estate -- at least some of which could be recouped through outright sales or leasing arrangements
3) some of the construction work already completed or in process relates to improvements and fixes that will make the CR more robust and in a better state of repair

So in reality not all that much of the sunk costs are just lost if you cancel GLX

The challenge now is to make sure that the new estimates are realistic [not low-balled like the original Patrick Administration numbers] and that costs can be kept under control during the 4 years of construction

The world sliding closer to a recession should relieve some pressure on materials and even on equipment rentals -- but as long as Boston is booming and the idea of letting the Unions fix the labor costs -- the Big Digish aspects of this project will persist

So which is it? Are the costs in or are they out? If we needed the vehicles anyway, then that $183MM should not be included in the overall project cost. If the CR projects are to partially benefit the CR, then they should be proportionally allocated to CR and deducted from project cost. Can't have it both ways.

As for real estate? Maaaybe. I believe that much of that expense is to expand the retaining walls into individual back yards.
 
not low-balled like the original Patrick Administration numbers

Did you somehow misunderstand the entire bidding scandal, or are you just not letting it get in the way of your obvious and constant axe grinding?
 
Guys, chronic unrepentant threadshitter is threadshitting for its own amusement again. Don't try to reason with it like it's feigning at being reasonable...just learn how to fiddle with the image tags in the quote block to paste over its name and mock it with pics of braindead shouty-radio caricatures whose fading demographics have aged into the 'catheter sales' set. Which has exactly the same effect--none whatsoever--as a well-reasoned counterpoint to said poster's talking points...but is vastly more satisfying.
MrGreen.svg
 
While I found what whighlander just said irritating as he just said that as a matter-of-fact ignore all previous discussion, countering it with the way you are doing is also pretty annoying to me too. It just feel like it is killing the seriousness of the discussion when it get interspersed with random sounds and pictures.


Also, since whighlander does give - while questionable, a response to challenges. I would like to see his response to underground. That line he just said that the Patrick Administration low balled ignores both how the contractor inflated their charges and how every other similar projects in the US is a whole tier lower in cost. The most obvious explanation is whighlander is quiet trolling with a second theory that he is following his ideaology. But I still want to know what he has to say that if 2BN is lowballing, that 3BN was the truthful amount, then how does he explain why similar projects are $2BN or lower?
 
Guys, chronic unrepentant threadshitter is threadshitting for its own amusement again. Don't try to reason with it like it's feigning at being reasonable...just learn how to fiddle with the image tags in the quote block to paste over its name and mock it with pics of braindead shouty-radio caricatures whose fading demographics have aged into the 'catheter sales' set. Which has exactly the same effect--none whatsoever--as a well-reasoned counterpoint to said poster's talking points...but is vastly more satisfying.
MrGreen.svg

F-Line -- stop giving a play-by-play as you preen in front of a mirror

This stuff is real -- real $ are involved -- and perhaps the people making the decisions are not your ideological soul-mates -- but they are the people making the decisions

If you have anything of real utility to contribute -- by all means

But if you just pine for the old days -- as the not-so-lamented Rick Pitino, coach of the Celtics once said -- "Robert Parish, Kevin McHale and Larry Bird are not coming through the doorway"

Mike S, like Mikhail Gorbachev is reduced to the name of an Institute at Northeastern -- the rest of his cronies and advisors are teaching some at various U's -- but nothing that any of them says means anything . The same is true of Scott and Devall -- history - -and irrelevant at that.

So you are faced with the reality that for the next few years the spending is not going to come as easy as it did in earlier times. Take a deep breath and join the 21st century with real solutions being conceptualized and implemented without the need for "30 year planning cycles" [modern successor to Stalin's and Lenin's 5 year plans
 
While I found what whighlander just said irritating as he just said that as a matter-of-fact ignore all previous discussion, countering it with the way you are doing is also pretty annoying to me too. It just feel like it is killing the seriousness of the discussion when it get interspersed with random sounds and pictures.


Also, since whighlander does give - while questionable, a response to challenges. I would like to see his response to underground. That line he just said that the Patrick Administration low balled ignores both how the contractor inflated their charges and how every other similar projects in the US is a whole tier lower in cost. The most obvious explanation is whighlander is quiet trolling with a second theory that he is following his ideaology. But I still want to know what he has to say that if 2BN is lowballing, that 3BN was the truthful amount, then how does he explain why similar projects are $2BN or lower?

I'm sorry, ant. You're not going to get a serious response trying to plead with him to be serious. Witness the post immediately after yours. Witness the herpes rash of whighjacks that's broken out over this subforum in the last 30 minutes. The wind-up is his favorite form of idle entertainment.


Want it to stop? Treat the behavior with the same reciprocal dignity in return as what it doles out. Board history has proven he knocks it off in a hurry when he senses that playing the heel may start counting against his serious cred in a different thread where he is genuinely contributing. Pleading for reason when he's telegraphing to the world he has no fucks to give just fuels the lulz.


Could be worse...this board could have, *gulp*, "hands-on moderation".
 
While I found what whighlander just said irritating as he just said that as a matter-of-fact ignore all previous discussion, countering it with the way you are doing is also pretty annoying to me too. It just feel like it is killing the seriousness of the discussion when it get interspersed with random sounds and pictures.


Also, since whighlander does give - while questionable, a response to challenges. I would like to see his response to underground. That line he just said that the Patrick Administration low balled ignores both how the contractor inflated their charges and how every other similar projects in the US is a whole tier lower in cost. The most obvious explanation is whighlander is quiet trolling with a second theory that he is following his ideaology. But I still want to know what he has to say that if 2BN is lowballing, that 3BN was the truthful amount, then how does he explain why similar projects are $2BN or lower?

Ant -- at least you read what I wrote

Here's how I came to my surmise [I wont dignify it by calling it a theory]:

1) Deval and company were wedded to the ideas of the CLF just as Dukakis and his crowd had been earlier -- many of them were true believers
2) The project is complex -- like the Big Dig there are a lot of bits of old infrastructure, many strange often human constructed topography that Denver might never face -- so the project was going to be expensive
3) The process of interminable reviews with the "locals" without some sort of control leads invariably to "Creeping Feature Syndrome" -- well if Brickbottom got one of those we're Lechmere we deserve 2
4) The entire Mass DOT was "poisoned" by the way that PB ran the Big Dig -- there were a lot fewer good DOT engineers in positions of authority after the BIG DIG was finished than before -- this extended to the T -- let someone else do it
5) Deval had no management experience and neither did most of his hires for the T from Scott on down to just above the hoi polloi
6) Unions -- they learned how to manipulate the system a long time ago in Boston -- but the Big Dig was their real opportunity to hone the "graft"
7) the Union contractors -- see #6
8) the CLF and Dukakis left overs -- they saw this as way not just to ameliorate the Big Dig - -but to "Get what was coming to me" and punish the Commonwealth's Taxpayers for the Big Dig
9) I'm sure that I can come up with #9 and #10 -- but I'll stop here

The ultimate solution of course is to put the responsibility for the T and other agencies that are designed to be "Boston"without letting the city run them into a Metropolitan County

And I'd even include Massport which does the best of all of the alphabet soup of agencies
 
BTW...something nice and on-topic to chew on:

New Globe article on priciest-ever MBTA projects, indexed to inflation: https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2...bta-history/bbHjra27mAlmNFqBQ9aFgL/story.html

Screenshotted the money-shot chart here:
10xsdhe.jpg


I presume Red-south Phase I to Quincy Ctr. was omitted because project went into design mid- MTA-to-MBTA transition. Also note the Red-north is the only one of these that was 100% subway, and included a TBM'ed segment...so there's some complex carry-the-one math to do there trying to figure how that translates to above-ground construction equivalencies consistent with the rest of the list.

EDIT: Also, Orange-south does not include the South Cove subway tunnel, which was built 20 years prior to the rest of the line as another one of those midstream MTA-to-MBTA transition projects. That cost is strictly for Back Bay-Forest Hills in the SW Corridor cut and going back to outfit the finished empty shell of NEMC/TMC station. So that one ends up closest in overall construction characteristics to GLX and benchmarking against GLX.
 
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BTW...something nice and on-topic to chew on:

New Globe article on priciest-ever MBTA projects, indexed to inflation: https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2...bta-history/bbHjra27mAlmNFqBQ9aFgL/story.html

Screenshotted the money-shot chart here:
10xsdhe.jpg


I presume Red-south Phase I to Quincy Ctr. was omitted because project went into design mid- MTA-to-MBTA transition. Also note the Red-north is the only one of these that was 100% subway, and included a TBM'ed segment...so there's some complex carry-the-one math to do there trying to figure how that translates to above-ground construction equivalencies consistent with the rest of the list.

Isn't Orange Line South extension one of the best comparisons, due to the construction down a very active rail corridor, needing to keep all that rail active throughout construction?
 
F-Line -- good find -- However, the chart is a bit unfair in that the Harvard to Alewife extension included an extensive rebuild of the Underground Harvard Square complex and deep tunneling to Porter and Davis plus the massive parking garage at Alewife

The closest that GLX has to that is the rebuild of Lechmere and the viaduct connections

The one that I find most instructive is Haymarket North which included a lot of tunneling to get to Community College as well as the mixed modes with the CR and a quite a mix of different types of stations. I'd like to try to understand how Orange Line North could be done for such a small amount in today's dollars -- for example was the North Station Superstation included in that cost, since it came along a lot later after the Green Line elevated was taken down
 
The Southwest Corridor was closed for SWC construction - the Providence/Stoughton Line, Franklin Line, and Amtrak service were rerouted over what is now the Fairmount Line. The Needham Line was bustituted; this was originally planned to be a permanent measure but community support resulted in its return in 1987. Still, it's probably the best comparison here. OL north was the only one constructed along an active commuter rail corridor, but that's mostly aboveground rather than trenched so construction was much easier.
 
What I can't extrapolate, because they don't say exactly what "archives" they're looking at, is how much of that Orange-south construction was split between Orange share and commuter rail share...or if it was all lump-summed under a single budget counted as Orange for these purposes. While the corridor was out-of-service for 7 years while it got nuked and rebuilt in a total cleanrooming, the cut was created whole-cloth where most of it didn't exist before. That's an extreme amount of retaining wall work and sheer volume of concrete used. Unlike the Lowell + Fitchburg corridors which were legacy, 4-track cuts with retaining walls clustered mainly around the GLX stations where pre-existing between-embankment space is at a premium.

If that really is an Orange-takes-all price tag, then they got some serious productivity for their money.
 
^ Do those other per-mile calculations include the cost of the cars that ride the rails? Because the GLX per-mile calculation does. Orange Line cars are all from 1979-1981, so I'm assuming they aren't included in the completed in '77 or '87 extension budgets. Same goes for Red Line, as cars are from '69-'70, '88, and '94 but extensions are completed in '83 and '85.

Take the cost of the cars ($183 million) out of the GLX budget and that $2.3b turns into $2.1b and the cost per mile drops to $448m. Still super expensive, but within 6% of the comparable trenched Orange Line south extension.
 

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