Uh oh, F-Line is confirmed to be human like the rest of us all. Quickly: Shut down the forum, even the architecture threads. The center is collaps... run for your li... save...
Careful. This 116-page threadmonument to histrionic overreaction is the last place on all of aB anyone should be finger-wagging about over-simplistic comeuppance. All those years of bandwidth expended by posters doing the pee-pee dance about why these virgin-design cars aren't being deployed sooner and invocations of "rustbuckets! rustbuckets! rustbuckets!" And whoda thunk it...complex machines needs lots of teething to shake the bugs out. Exactly as it's been before every time we've broken in new-generation cars, and exactly as it is in other cities.
Where here do we have conclusive confirmation that it was 100.00% the trucks and 0.00% literally any other factor on the whole system??? Nowhere. People are assuming such because...I don't know, sports? Like: gotta root for/against laundry on the Internet because reasons.
If this were truly a matter of
TRUCKS BAD TRACK GOOD beyond shadow of doubt, they wouldn't have aborted the entire mission and bustituted the line for 3 straight weeks to blitz-replace all the infrastructure. The 46-year-old switch it derailed on--original 1975-installation infrastructure--was a known vulnerability, way past replacement age and being pressed into all-day service with each alternating movement. It's quite very unlikely its impact on the derailment probabilities was zero-dot-zero. If it were they could've just cleaned up and restarted the next day with the 01200's instead of summoning the shuttle buses. It's almost as if things aren't nihilistically over-simplistic, and confluence of events tickled the wrong probabilities. The trucks had a design flaw that increased wheel resistance over time. That escalated truck resistance was likeliest to manifest itself passing through crossover switches. If *any old* crossover switches were to serve up the potential hazard, it was the ones at Oak Grove and Forest Hills used on every single revenue turnback all-day/every-day. But the end-of-line crossovers are overbuilt for the punishment of all-day use and aren't malingering many many years past rated end-of-life. So we didn't get the whole-enchilada fleet pulled over
that risk. No...the immediate scramble with the bustitution was to blitz-replace the past-end-of-life switches.
OK? Just because the true nature of the fault was ultimately ID'd to the individual component level does not automatically exonerate all other factors. It was probably still an unwise top-level decision to single-track the ops around the construction zone and overtask such past-prime infrastructure...because that's where the exploit ended up getting triggered rather than any regular-service switch. Complex systems: why they be all complex and shit?!?!
Jesus Christ, this thread.