If anyone is a zoning attorney here they can say with more authority, but I work in the business and have dealt with variances many times. One simply needs to show that one will have a direct and negative impact because of changes allowed by the variance. Abutters are automatically given standing. I believe the Jeweler's building is an abutter. Views aren't the only impact that one can claim. Traffic is the most obvious impact that one can claim and both the folks at 45 Province and Millennium Tower can easily make the claim that traffic will demonstrably worsen. Either way, a lawsuit need not be legitimate to succeed. Any court case will take a minimum of two years in land court to litigate.
I think that you are close enough!
The city allows height increases because it gives the city maximum discretion to deny. Menino was king of this sort of thing. It is a crappy way to plan a city.
Anyway, for the actual legal standards, I cut and pasted the following discussion of standards from an old pleading of mine. So enjoy (or nod off), and read No 1 and No 7 closely:
1. The Zoning Act, G.L. c. 40A § 10, provides that a variance may only be granted if the:
permit granting authority specifically finds that owing to circumstances relating to the soil conditions, shape, or topography of such land or structures and especially affecting such land or structures but not affecting generally the zoning district in which it is located, a literal enforcement of the provisions of the ordinance or by-law would involve substantial hardship, financial or otherwise, to the petitioner or appellant, and that desirable relief may be granted without substantial detriment to the public good and without nullifying or substantially derogating from the intent or purpose of such ordinance or by-law.
2. The long-settled rule in interpreting G.L. c.40A §10 is that an applicant for a variance is not entitled to any relief and that the permit granting authority has broad discretion to deny the application even if evidence shows that the variance could have been granted. See Pendergast v. Board of Appeals of Barnstable, 331 Mass. 555, 557 (1954). The rule provides that no “person acquires a legal right to a variance by bringing himself within the terms” of the variance requirements. Id. An applicant satisfying the statutory requirements “merely gives a discretionary power to the board to be exercised, if at all, only on the conditions set forth therein.” Id.
3. “Variances are always in derogation of the zoning system adopted by the [City] under its lawful powers. Since [the local zoning bylaw] confers upon the landowner only an opportunity and not a right, if the board of appeals decides against him he commonly has no right enforceable in court.” Id.
4. The Board, as the local authority familiar with the conditions in the City, is vested with the power to, in strictly limited circumstances, grant relief from local law. Id. This limited power does not, however, require that a variance be granted in any particular case. See Huntington v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Hadley, 12 Mass. App. Ct. 710, 715 (1981).
5. An applicant for a variance bears the burden of proof in establishing that all prerequisites for the issuance of a variance set forth under G.L. c. 40A, §10 have been satisfied. Warren v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Amherst, 383 Mass. 1, 10 (1981); Kirkwood v. Board of Appeals of Rockport, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 423, 427 (1984).
6. The statutory criteria for a variance must be strictly construed, and even where the applicant shows evidence regarding the statutory requirements, a variance is to be sparingly granted. See, e.g., Damaskos v. Board of Appeals of Boston, 359 Mass. 55, 60-61 (1971); Tsagronis v. Board of Appeals of Wareham, 415 Mass. 329, 331-31 (1993); Gamache v. Acushnet, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 215, 217 (1982); Kirkwood v. Board of Appeals of Rockport, 17 Mass. App. Ct. 423, 427 (1984).
7. As the Appeals Court held in Guiragossian v. Board of Appeals of Watertown, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 111, 115 (1985), rev. den., 396 Mass. 1105 (1986), “
ince the requirements for the grant of a variance are conjunctive, not disjunctive, a failure to establish any one of them is fatal.”
8. On appeal, the burden is on the party seeking the variance to produce evidence that the statutory requirements have been met and that the variance is justified. Blackman v. Board of Appeals of Barnstable, 334 Mass. 446,450 (1956); Dion v. Board of Appeals of Waltham, 344 Mass. 547, 555-556 (1962); DiGiovanni v. Board of Appeal of Rockport, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 339, 350, rev. den., 394 Mass. 1103 (1985).