Logan Airport Flights and Airlines Discussion

Someone with insider info on the other site did give me the top 5 connecting destinations in Panama City from Boston. Surprisingly, neither Sao Paulo or Belo Horizonte made the list

That is really surprising, though the connection through PTY to Belo Horizonte isn't all that great.
 
Any further news on Avianca starting Bogota-Boston flights?
 
Just came back from Hong Kong last night on the new Cathay Pacific route. It was a really nice flight both ways. A good 80% of the flight last night were people not from the United States based on the lines at customs. The flight was pretty full, and it seemed like nearly every seat was taken. This seems like a great addition to Logan. I would highly recommend the route and Cathay Pacific.

On a completely unrelated note, but part of this forum: for every 1 amazing skyscraper I saw in Hong Kong, there were 30 or 40 really ugly tower blocks. So, maybe we should appreciate the quality of design here in Boston. (....everything except the Kensington & Seaport Park Lane, which should be imploded IMHO.)
 
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Preview of Boston in a few years?
 
It may get even better. Someone on airliners just mentioned that Boston-Cologne/Bonn is in the works on Lufthansa's long-haul LCC called Eurowings.

A quick google search shows this
http://www.exbir.de/reise-magazin/14456-2015-09-13-20-56-05.html

Awesome. Also, noticed this money quote in the article you linked (with an assist from Google Translate)

"Condor flew earlier successfully for 99 € to Las Vegas and Vancouver - significantly longer distances. Only the large shortfall in capacity through the many mergers of the major American airlines ensured higher and not fair market prices through artificial scarcity. "

Remarkable, because you'd never find a statement like that in any english-language publication.
 
Just came back from Hong Kong last night on the new Cathay Pacific route. It was a really nice flight both ways. A good 80% of the flight last night were people not from the United States based on the lines at customs. The flight was pretty full, and it seemed like nearly every seat was taken. This seems like a great addition to Logan. I would highly recommend the route and Cathay Pacific.

On a completely unrelated note, but part of this forum: for every 1 amazing skyscraper I saw in Hong Kong, there were 30 or 40 really ugly tower blocks. So, maybe we should appreciate the quality of design here in Boston. (....everything except the Kensington & Seaport Park Lane, which should be imploded IMHO.)

Cathay Pacific along with Singapore are two of my favorite airlines in the Pacific Region

It would be great to see Singapore landing and taking off from Logan -- just on the hairy edge of the B787-9 range


By the way fascinating website provided by Boeing

it shows every B787 enroute at a glance and you can click on any flight to get a flight map or you can filter by airline, or city

http://www.boeing.com/commercial/787/#/flight-tracker
 
It would be great to see Singapore landing and taking off from Logan -- just on the hairy edge of the B787-9 range

If they come it would be via point in East Asia or Europe (more likely).

They are getting closer with JetBlue (codeshare and frequent flier reciprocity) but I think they like having the Virgin Atlantic codeshare.
 
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Awesome. Also, noticed this money quote in the article you linked (with an assist from Google Translate)

"Condor flew earlier successfully for 99 € to Las Vegas and Vancouver - significantly longer distances. Only the large shortfall in capacity through the many mergers of the major American airlines ensured higher and not fair market prices through artificial scarcity. "

Remarkable, because you'd never find a statement like that in any english-language publication.

... In part because English-language publications worth their salt usually don't make patently non sequitur or unexplained assertions. How does anyone know what the "right" amount of capacity is? It would need to be an amount that allows airlines to maintain themselves and generate a reasonable amount of profit allowing a return that investors find attractive in relation to other investment opportunities.

And what makes prices "not fair" or supply "artificially scarce"? Is a deus ex machina or other non-market force arbitrarily setting them? Is the government setting prices or restricting supply?

Without justifying those statements, this article reads like something composed by a academically challenged 14-year-old testing the limits of how much he can rebel against his parents' values.
 
And what makes prices "not fair" or supply "artificially scarce"? Is a deus ex machina or other non-market force arbitrarily setting them? Is the government setting prices or restricting supply?

You do realize you are criticizing and quoting an automated translation of the original... one can hardly can expect coherent arguments to come out.
 
^^ That doesn't make any sense.

Either:

1) The translation is total nonsense, in which case (a) who cares?, and (b) CSTH's point is moot

or

2) The translation (which is also what you get by inputting the German original into Google Translate) has any merit whatsoever, in which case the article is inserting highly subjective and unjustified assertions with no backing

At the end of the day, this is some third-rate site with design principles that look like Guy Fieri after a shopping spree at Ed Hardy, so I don't give much of a hoot. But I don't think anyone should aspire for the US media (bad enough as it is) to sink to that level of reflexive leftist pablum.
 
Under perfect competition, competitors keep delivering capacity to the market/customers until long term profits tend to zero (that Airlines have traditionally overshot and been net losers does not disprove this, but rather confirms it). {And both the airlines and economists have historically agreed that air travel is (or was) close to textbook perfect.} From the customer's view, the "right" amount of capacity is the amount that maximizes trip-making and drives suppliers profits' to zero.

From a public policy standpoint the "right" amount is "enough to be barely profitable" because it eliminates the deadweight loss incurred when the market is underserved (trips don't happen that would have).

Sustained profits at some point suggest imperfect competition, and constraining capacity below the market-clearing zero-profit line. This really can only be done by withholding capacity at a time when adding capacity would otherwise be marginally profitable (like now...if the market's structure were capable of delivering the "right" capacity, somebody'd be pulling gas guzzlers from the desert and making an airline with them)

In the past, with 10 majors, there was always somebody who "rebelled" against the status quo who added capacity and gained market share when kerosene prices plummeted (as they recently have). Where are those entrants? Where are those rebels? (historically Northwest or America West/LCC)

Whether this is bad or illegal is a separate question, but "capacity restraint" is sustained by discouraging entry or tacit collusion (which is easier with 4 majors than it ever was with 10). The only evidence you need is sustained profits quarter after quarter. It isn't clear how many quarters you need to say "this isn't just random/free competition" but they sure are accumulating.
 
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Under perfect competition, competitors keep delivering capacity to the market/customers until long term profits tend to zero (that Airlines have traditionally overshot and been net losers does not disprove this, but rather confirms it). {And both the airlines and economists have historically agreed that air travel is (or was) close to textbook perfect.} From the customer's view, the "right" amount of capacity is the amount that maximizes trip-making and drives suppliers profits' to zero.

From a public policy standpoint the "right" amount is "enough to be barely profitable" because it eliminates the deadweight loss incurred when the market is underserved (trips don't happen that would have).

Sustained profits at some point suggest imperfect competition, and constraining capacity below the market-clearing zero-profit line. This really can only be done by withholding capacity at a time when adding capacity would otherwise be marginally profitable (like now...if the market's structure were capable of delivering the "right" capacity, somebody'd be pulling gas guzzlers from the desert and making an airline with them)

In the past, with 10 majors, there was always somebody who "rebelled" against the status quo who added capacity and gained market share when kerosene prices plummeted (as they recently have). Where are those entrants? Where are those rebels? (historically Northwest or America West/LCC)

Whether this is bad or illegal is a separate question, but "capacity restraint" is sustained by discouraging entry or tacit collusion (which is easier with 4 majors than it ever was with 10). The only evidence you need is sustained profits quarter after quarter. It isn't clear how many quarters you need to say "this isn't just random/free competition" but they sure are accumulating.

The maturing of the Tranatlantic Joint Ventures have really killed low-prices on major airlines.

I find it very interesting that Delta Virgin and British Airways are always typically identical in price at least a month or more out.
 
The maturing of the Tranatlantic Joint Ventures have really killed low-prices on major airlines.

I find it very interesting that Delta Virgin and British Airways are always typically identical in price at least a month or more out.

I have been pricing tickets to Asia from NYC for work, and very consistently the US3 have exactly the same price (down to the dollar) for the JFK-TYO segment. It's not a coincidence since it has happened for multiple dates. It's amazing to me that this isn't considered collusion.
 
^ Matching prices is simply the optimal short-term pricing strategy. Prices at parity is generally healthy and rational. Nothing to see here.

The game theory and microeconomics both say if you see a competitor raise prices, generally you raise yours, keep the same market share and pocket a few extra few bucks. If you see a competitor lower prices, you generally lower yours so as not to lose marginal customers but you will suffer the loss of a few bucks. Trying to price higher or lower are both losing strategies (Southwest undercuts high-price airports by choosing slightly different endpoints (eg BWI vs DCA), but even this eventually stabilizes at about the cost of cab ride from BWI to DCA)

What's needed is capacity competition (encouraged by upping airport capacity) because that's where consumer wins come from.

New nonstops between A and B typically lower prices in the market and near-always do s if there had been no direct service (this was originally counterintuitive to me...I thought the nonstop should command higher average fares, the general rule though, is that the top fare bucket may rise a little bit vs connections, but overall it results in lower average fares A to B because now you need to fill a whole plane, not just a marginal seat or two)

The complaint isn't that prices are equal, it is that capacity in directly- or closely-competitive markets isn't rising as fuel prices fall.

Airlines hate spare gates at airports. Probably the purest example is Northwest's financing deal for its enormous new terminal at DTW (c. 1999) which was contingent on the airport authority demolishing perfectly good gates at its old hub complex (some were crappy, sure, but they demolished *all* of them lest some fall into an LCC's hands).

But the deal to "Free" DAL (Love Field) was just as bad. At the same time that they lifted the anti-competitive Wright Amendment the new deal limited DAL to 20 gates BY FEDERAL LAW, 16 of which Southwest would control (and 2 more of which it has since leased from United). So Southwest controls 80% to 90% of capacity and nobody can enter the market (Virgin got AA's final 2 gates) And the Airport had to demolish or promise never to use again the Legend Airlines terminal--a loss for consumers. DAL is a big airport purposely limited by gate restrictions (so is DCA, which demolished the old AA pier to restrict the number of gates).
 
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Price parity might be healthy given enough competition because the market will eventually settle on the lowest economically viable price. However with only three major carriers in the US, there is little incentive to drive the price down even in a large market like NYC-TYO. I agree 100% that increasing capacity is right right solution, however I don't see it happening with the current levels of competition. It reeks of anti-competitiveness when all three players have the same hugely inflated price, especially in a time when costs are so low.

I'll follow this up with an anecdote. I can't recall a time where I've seen three majors with the same price on the same date until the past few months where it's started to happen more and more. Of course the internet and pricing algorithms make it easier to quickly change your price to match a competitor's, but that would have been possible five years ago as well. I think the major driver of this is airline consolidation and reduction of competition, aka "capacity discipline".
 
Under perfect competition, competitors keep delivering capacity to the market/customers until long term profits tend to zero (that Airlines have traditionally overshot and been net losers does not disprove this, but rather confirms it). {And both the airlines and economists have historically agreed that air travel is (or was) close to textbook perfect.} From the customer's view, the "right" amount of capacity is the amount that maximizes trip-making and drives suppliers profits' to zero.

From a public policy standpoint the "right" amount is "enough to be barely profitable" because it eliminates the deadweight loss incurred when the market is underserved (trips don't happen that would have).

Sustained profits at some point suggest imperfect competition, and constraining capacity below the market-clearing zero-profit line. This really can only be done by withholding capacity at a time when adding capacity would otherwise be marginally profitable (like now...if the market's structure were capable of delivering the "right" capacity, somebody'd be pulling gas guzzlers from the desert and making an airline with them)

In the past, with 10 majors, there was always somebody who "rebelled" against the status quo who added capacity and gained market share when kerosene prices plummeted (as they recently have). Where are those entrants? Where are those rebels? (historically Northwest or America West/LCC)

Whether this is bad or illegal is a separate question, but "capacity restraint" is sustained by discouraging entry or tacit collusion (which is easier with 4 majors than it ever was with 10). The only evidence you need is sustained profits quarter after quarter. It isn't clear how many quarters you need to say "this isn't just random/free competition" but they sure are accumulating.

Sustained profit can also be an indicator that one (or more) of the competitors has managed to differentiate their offering above the value level of the zero profit commodity suppliers.
 
Sustained profit can also be an indicator that one (or more) of the competitors has managed to differentiate their offering above the value level of the zero profit commodity suppliers.
True, but this can only be the explanation for one carrier--the differentiated one--usually a small/niche one.

Allegiant has made much better returns than the rest of the industry and, true to theory, they are profoundly different flying (and pricing) experiences. And Frontier and Spirit are trying to emulate.

And in little corners of the market we could defend the idea that competitively-isolated carriers would make better-than-standard profits (as JetBlue, Alaska, Virgin Atlantic did at the peak of their "upstartness") At this point Southwest is too big to sustain much of a claim differentiation, it just happens to hub at DAL, HOU, BWI, and MDW instead of DFW, IAH, IAD or ORD)

The current complaint is that the 4 majors (UA, AA, DL and WN), or the majors and their alliances UA/LHStar, AA/BA/OneWorld, DL/KL/AF/SkyTeam are all profiting--its near impossible that that's differentiation (if it were, we'd have to ask: different from whom?)

And satisfaction with air travel is generally down, so it is hard to make the case that the majors differentiated versus some other mode or leisure activity.

"Collusion" is the more likely than "differentiation" as the source of near-whole-industry profits.

{The other thing that undercuts any claim of "differentiation" is that we don't see any Major or any Transatlantic Alliance claiming a pricing premium. As discussed immediately upthread, the Majors/Alliances are practicing strict pricing parity. If they are all profiting, it is because it has been easy to maintain "the ranks" and none will "break ranks" and there's no fear of entry}
 
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More info on Boston-Cologne.

3 weekly Sun Tues Thur. Departure times were posted on a Cologne Airport forum and airliners.

Departure Tue 5:20p Estimated Arrival Tues - 7.20pm
Departure Thu 4:25p Estimated Arrival Thu - 6.25pm
Departure Sun 3:45p Estimated Arrival Sun: 5.45pm

No idea about the following:

- departures: most likely 2 hour turns which is what Lufthansa does.
-connections - will JetBlue feed? most likely there will be feed in Cologne on North African and European flights.

It may be bookable soon - there will be some sort of partnership with charter company TUIfly in Germany.
 

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